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Reflet-Reflétant: mediator between internalism and externalism

Critique on the concept of the mental representation

Abstract

In the present problem situation (Popper) of the philosophy of the mental, research programs can be recognized which claim to systematize the relation between non-conceptual consciousness, ego consciousness and the intentional contents of mental representations, for example a frame of reference for the varieties of subjectivity.[1] However, the return to Sartre's philosophy of the subject as a historical position in the great upheavals of 20th century social history has a systematic relevance in the hybrid present problem situation of the philosophy of the mental. It provides "helpful differentiations" and can take a possible role of a mediator as a theoretical contribution to the debate between internalism (representationalism) and externalism (anti-representationalism) in the contemporary philosophy of mental (so-called mind). However, in order to connect to the current situation in epistemology, philosophy of the mental, and ontology, Sartre's "early philosophy" requires a reinterpretation.

If we bridge from Sartre's early philosophy to the debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind, he gets a new actuality and is updated vis-à-vis his meanwhile for us remote historical philosophical position. This also concerns the criticism of the concept of mental representation as a basic concept of the philosophy of the mental. How far this really carries philosophically remains to be further explored. Sartre's Marxist socio-political philosophy and his "Ultrabolshevism" (Merleau Ponty) are not of interest here. [2]

Contents

Introduction:

Representational and phenomenal content

The connection of Sartre's early philosophy to the philosophy of the mental in the 1990s and the present problem situation of epistemology, philosophy of the mental and ontology consists in the fact that the external world of external objects and events is to be classified as *averse to consciousness* and thus has a *broad, external* or *representational* content. However, it also has a content *turned toward consciousness* and thus *narrow* or *phenomenal.* This content *preservation,* however, has intrinsic properties and is precisely not determined by the surface of the physical objects of the environment. The problem relation of content conservation arises in the transition of first-level consciousness to second-level consciousness, for example, the versions of higher-order theories and self-representation or the adoption of reflexive judgments and phenomenal intentionalism, for example, Burge, Tye, Horgan. According to Tye's phenomenal intentionalism there is only the (only) representational content that is not inner-conscious. In contrast, according to Sartre, the consciousness of objects (intentionality) is pre-

reflexively transparent for every subject (person). However, it has no internal properties. Accordingly, the phenomenal content is reflected. It mirrors the representational content and thus modifies it slightly.

Sartre's early philosophy needs a reinterpretation in order to establish a connection rationality to the present problem situation. Among the German philosophers, Frank and Seel have made an instructive resystematization, which is helpful as orientation.[3] At the same time, it builds a bridge to the present philosophy of the mental and makes a reference back to the early romantic situation of the philosophy of German idealism and Fichte's "original insight" (Henrich[4]).

It is advisable, in order to lead to the problem reference to be dealt with, to first briefly discuss Sartre's epistemology and ontology, his critique of Berkeley, which has a systematic relevance for him. The central problem reference here is that consciousness is not its own being. (1., 2.) This leads to the concept of reflet-reflétant and its analysis. The central problem reference here is the concept of intentional content. (3.) This refers to the new type of ontology and the assignment of the distinction between internalism and externalism to it. This is a new conclusion from the present state of research of the confrontation with the early Sartre and the proof of his relevance in the contemporary philosophy of the mental. (4.) However, we must not stop there. The follow-up problems of Sartre's epistemology and phenomenological ontology have to be addressed and the problem of de se constraint in the present philosophy of the mental has to be addressed. This leads to a fundamental problem in Sartre's early philosophy and in contemporary philosophy. The question of the noema arises. (5.) In sum: It is to renew the concept of epistemological mediators in the philosophy of mental, epistemology and ontology as well. (6)

The presented account is to be checked against the systematizations of the contemporary philosophy of the mental. It has to prove itself and to be continued, but also to be corrected if necessary.

1. Types of being: epistemology and ontology

Sartre distinguishes between the three types of *being-for-itself (pour soi)*, *being-in-itself (en soi)* and *being-in-and-for-itself (valeur)* and their relations. It is important to note that *being-for-itself* is not *being-for-me.* It is *spontaneous*, *empty* and *transparent.* The being-for-itself of the external environment is *substantial/autonomous*, *identical/simple*, *actual/real/contingent,* and *indeterminate.*[5] The *being-in-itself* has the position of Kant's regulative idea. The *cogito* cannot be known only by reflection with itself. In this respect, it requires its pre-reflexive familiarity. "The reflected gives itself as having already been there before - before the reflection".[6] Only then can the reflecting perform the act of reflection.

Sartre's subject theory conceives subjectivity as pre-reflexive consciousness. The ontology of the subject states that it is given a *being* by the objective external world. Here, the "being-out-of-value (*an-and-for-itself-being*)" is the constitution of the temporality of subjectivity and its design structure. Thus, self-consciousness is not determined by being. Subjectivity is thus pre-reflexive (non-setting): "La subjectivité, c'est la conscience (de) conscience".[7] For its part, the temporalization of *reflet-reflétant* occurs through the intervention of the An-ich, which separates the *reflet-reflétant* hermetic *system.* This leads over to the existential constitution of subjectivity, which claims to realize itself in the world through the (existential) design as an *An-sich-for-itself (En-soi-Pour-soi).* But this design

is the reason of its failure: "L'homme est une passion inutile".[8] In this respect, *Les jeux sont faits* is to be taken literally. [9]

The existential centering of the ontology of the subject is to be presented via the pre-reflexive consciousness and the relation of the design situation to the *being-in-and-for-itself (valeur).* This is the problem reference of Sartre's analysis of time consciousness (G. Seel, Frank) The relation between *being-for-itself*, *being-on-itself* and *being-on-and-for-itself* characterizes the *réalité humain.* In contrast to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time, it is* not being-centered, but *existentially* subject-centered.

It is advisable, in order to lead to the problem reference to be dealt with, to first briefly discuss Sartre's Epistemology and Ontology and his critique of Berkeley, which has a systematic relevance for him. (2.)

2. Prevention of circularity and recourse

(a) Objectified consciousness

Sartre's argument for the primacy of pre-reflexivity is done in two steps. He argues with circularity and regress. They are present when self-consciousness is grounded on self-knowledge (*Selbstwissen*) and being as a becoming-knowable. He starts methodically from the cogito axiom. The cogito cannot face itself as an object. In this respect, the cogito as an "I know myself" presupposes a pre-reflexive consciousness. In doing so, he classifies the cogito, as does Descartes, as a mental state (event) that includes, for example, thinking/judging, feeling, and perceiving. The knowledge of the cogito cannot face itself as an object. Thus, the *cogito's knowledge of itself cannot be*

described by objectification, that is, reflection. Reflection on the cogito presupposes a non-thetical consciousness. In the context of the analytic theory of self-consciousness, this referring to *oneself as to oneself* addresses the *de se* requirement.

(b) Criticism of Berkeley

Frank emphasizes that Sartre's interpretation of Cogito as

1. "I have consciousness" or as
2. "I recognize/know"

is charged with a complication.[10] "2." does not exclude the error. In contrast, "1." is an apodictic certainty. The fundamentalist premise in the introductory situation leads to the consequential problem of how we conceptualize truth-difference and self-preservation of thought when apodictic certainty does not fall into the true-false dimension. However this may be, we hold that the reflexive cogito presupposes the pre-reflexive cogito.

Berkeley's epistemology rejected Lock's distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the latter's theory of abstraction. The regress argument concerns Sartre's criticism of Berkeley's epistemology of subjective idealism, of "esse est percipi," as an ontological idealism (Sartre's translation says: Being consists in being known). This raises the question of the being of the *cognizing*. Is the cognizing according to being itself? If the question is answered negatively, the answer ends in nothingness. It is a *reductio ad absurdum*, which leaves us helpless.[11] But as far as the question is answered positively, an infinite regress occurs, because the cognizing refers to a further cognizing, which is only then, as far as it is cognized and for this cognizing

the same is valid ad infinitum. In this respect the *percipi* depends on the assumption of existence of the *percipient.* This is true under the assumption that there is consciousness. According to Sartre, however, the being of consciousness is not its own being, since consciousness denies (negates) being from itself. This leads to the structure of *reflet* and *reflétant*.

3. Reflet reflétant

(a)   Jeu de réflexion reflétant

The French language distinguishes between "réfléchir" and "refléter". The reading that Sartre makes says: "Réfléchir" is the activity of reflecting. Reflection means a knowledge ("le savoir", "la connaissance") as an "implique distinction de l'objet et du sujet".[12] "Refléter", in contrast, means *reflecting* as a "mirroring". In the game of reflecting and reflecting on oneself ("jeu de réflexion reflétant") no knowledge opposition occurs.

Sartre's metaphorical speech of the contradiction of *reflet* and *reflétant*, of appearance and reflection, has an epistemological rationally comprehensible content.

1. He assumes that the distinguishing criterion for consciousness from object data is   "empty", that is, a *néant d'etre.* The "I" is expelled from the interior. "There is nothing in consciousness as consciousness, no content, also no subject behind consciousness, as Husserl (from 1913) erroneously assumed, also no so-called transcendence in immanence. States do not emerge *in* reflection, they emerge "through reflection".

2. The problem reference consists in the fact that the connection of a strong representationalist approach with regard to external reality with the pre-reflexive intrinsic performances of consciousness as its self-transparency has to be explained epistemologically on their part. There is only one intentional object in this relation.

3. Frank distinguishes three formulas to investigate this relationship.

(a) The *formula of pre-reflexivity* (total non-differentiation, irrelativity as the first step). This concerns the problem of the question of the content, which must not cloud the transparency of consciousness. The *reflet-reflétant* has two components, in this respect it could question the pre-reflexivity of consciousness. Does the *dyad reflet-reflétant* mediate the transition between the two?

(b) The *formula of the consciousness of itself*. The "of" is to be put in brackets to distinguish it from the objective consciousness. The *for-itself* is a type of being of its own kind and is to be distinguished from the type of *being-in-itself* (Être en-soi). The structure of *reflet-reflétant* puts both types of being into a relation, whereby pre-reflective consciousness is self-evident and the true-false dimension of knowledge does not exclude error a priori: To every true statement there is a negation that refers to the propositional content (G. Frege). In this respect, the truth dimension contains at the same time the falsity dimension.

(c) The *formula of the intentionality of consciousness*. The first formula in (a) consists in the "potential opposition" of the *reflet-reflétant*, and it is real only through its non-identity. In this respect, Sartre assumes that "consciousness is not what it is and is what it is not".

The at first sight obvious incoherence between the first formula in the step to the third formula, is bridged by the second formula, because the self-

reflecting mirror is not clouded by any object, that is, the intentional object remains outside the conscious monad.

(b)   Intentional content

The title *L'être et le néant* is motivated by the fact that the *néant d'être nullifies* being. An appearance is not nothing. It only denies its own reality (*rien* in contrast to *néant*). The reflecting object has no intrinsic property of consciousness.[13] It must be kept in mind that the object is not a direct object of consciousness, but it is a *reflétant* which interrupts the inside/outside differentiation. His epistemology assumes that the external world, the opaque object, is conscious as a *reflétant* in the *jeu reflet-reflétant.* This could be expressed as the intentional content is conscious as reflex, but not the object. Frank's reconstruction states that the *reflet-reflétant* belongs to consciousness as a moment of the *structural wholeness of* intentional consciousness as a consciousness-consciousness of ___. This wholeness differentiates in the time dimension, that is, consciousness is not what it is and is what it is not. In this respect we are existentially condemned to freedom. For epistemological and semantic externalism, there is no such relation.

4. Dual existential monism

(a)   New ontology type

With the ontological proof of consciousness, Sartre claims to establish a new type of ontology and theory of the concrete subject. The justification of the

antecedence of being prior to consciousness and the concomitant transformation of pre-reflective consciousness into intentional consciousness is established by the "ontological proof of consciousness."[14] Sartre's ontological proof interprets the ontology of being-in-itself (*en-soi*) presupposed in the relation of *reflet-reflétant* as a realm of being (external environment) that cannot be negated.[15] Only when the reflex represents something does it exclude the reflected from itself. The representational content has ontologically a wide content averted from consciousness. This is the meaning of the statement *L'existence précède l'essence*.[16]

(b)   Assignment to internalism and externalism

If we assign Sartre's epistemology and ontology of the subject (Für-sich, pour soi) of his early philosophy to *internalism* and *externalism* since the 1970s, a differentiated picture emerges.

- *Internalism is that we cannot place ourselves on an observer's standpoint outside our perceptions and observe from there what causes them. Thus there is no omniscient observer or Laplace demon who knows all the laws by which we systematize the relation between the mental and the physical.*
- *Externalism objects that because if we have true beliefs and the identity of their contents about the environment, then they are to be individuated outside of us in the environment and not by internal mental properties. The content of thoughts is not in the head (Putnam: meaning ain't in the head).*

From the *ontological* point of view, Sartre's epistemology and ontology of the subject is a *strict externalism of* the mental. This concerns the role of positional (thetic, intentional) consciousness (reference intentionality). It is, from the epistemological point of view, a mental *type internalism of the* objects in the external environment. This concerns the cogito axiom and non-positional, pre-reflexive consciousness as well as positional consciousness, since the experience of objects is only probable.

Sartre's epistemology and ontology of the subject, however, is at the same time also

2. a *strict externalism of* the existence of the objects of the environment. In this respect it is an *anti-internalism of* the objects and events of the environment. This concerns the anti-internalism of the ontology of being-in-itself (*en-soi*). From the ontological point of view, it corresponds to an epistemological mental *internalism.*

But he is at the same time

3. from an ontological point of view a *wide externalism of* the mental and the external environment. This concerns the reinterpretation of Sartre's concept of intentionality as a consciousness-consciousness of ___.

If we assign Sartre's epistemology and ontology to *internalism* and *externalism*, this is in accordance with the fact that a *strict externalism* implies a *weak externalism.* Sartre's epistemology is not externalist, however, because it presupposes pre-reflexive familiarity with our mental states.[17] We can call this a *pre-reflexive internalism of* external representations. Consistent with this is the fact that analytic relations between purely mental and purely

physical concepts have not been demonstrated, and purely physical properties do not follow from purely mental properties.[18]

However, the comparison between Sartre's existential phenomenology of *réalité humaine* and internalism and externalism is limited by the fact that it is an existential view of the Human Condition and not a reinterpretation of the place of human beings in the world in which they are embedded. From the perspective of Sartre's existentialism, 'we' are not parts of the environment. This would not be consistent with Sartre's concept of freedom. This is what distinguishes his existentialism from Camus. We can interpret Sartre's ontology of the concrete subject as an option for a dual existential monism. It is a critique of a substance dualism (Descartes), a subjective idealism (Berkeley), an absolute ego/production idealism (Fichte), and of Hegel's systems philosophy and the absolute knowledge of his Phenomenology of Spirit), but also of naturalism (materialism) in 19th century epistemology and its history of impact from Sartre's perspective in the 1930s.

5. Critical note

(a) Being-in-itself: ontological problem

(i) Mediation between internalism and externalism

Sartre as a possible mediator between internalism (representationalism) and externalism (anti-representationalism) concerns an answer to the relation between mental representation and represented reality as well as non-

conceptual (immediate, pre-reflexive) and conceptual (ego) consciousness. If we take this motivation seriously, however, corrections have to be made to Sartre's early philosophy from the point of view of the problem situation of the philosophy of the mental.

Sartre determines the being-in-itself by a strict identity. However, this needs a correction, which is obvious in his analysis of time-consciousness.[19] Sartre's *pre-reflexive internalism of* external representations ontically assigns Sartre to the realm of what is present in the environment (Heidegger). Seel draws attention to the fact that Sartre keeps the conceptual status of the made ontic distinctions *substantial/autonomous*, *identical/simple*, *actual/real/contingent,* and *indeterminate* unclear. They cannot be taken up directly from this realm. They do not come to us. This points to the problem of ontology in determining the relation "consciousness-consciousness of ___" in terms of the external environment and the extent of its deontologization. In this respect, we have to dispose of identity conditions by which we distinguish, describe, selectively observe and specify the structure (ontology) of the presupposed object realm of our world-being. The operations applied in this process are always temporal, situational, and two-valued distinctions. Their application, in turn, has to prove and restabilize itself in the time dimension. We cannot totally negate or exclude and prevent the immediately perceptible and observable world (things, properties, events, facts).

(ii)   Everyday ontology

In everyday life we are naive ontologists (direct realists, common sense realists), because we cannot negate the environment of consciousness. But this does not claim that the environment is accessible to us without linguistic

distinctions concerning the observer and the observation of observers. Nor do quantum slices and the distinction between micro- and macro-worlds come to us. Nor can we directly express in our object language their truth conditions. This is true for any scientific discipline. The inadequate evidence of the propositional content of intentionality falls into the domain of the content of cognition and thus of memory, propositional attitudes, and error. The synthetic judgments we make in the process, even if we presuppose them for cognition, are in principle correctable. The external evidences are thus incomplete, since cognition of external reality is structured by referents.

(b) Ego consciousness: *de se* requirement

(i) Problem of the concept of ego

Sartre's phenomenology would collapse if the ego did not have a relative existence in the systematics of his phenomenology. It is an object of consciousness. He does not deny that the reference of an ego utterance in the first person refers to an I, but the I is given only by reflection. It is not a subject of consciousness. The early Sartre claims to grasp ego consciousness from pre-reflective consciousness. However, this requires correction. Sartre's argument states, "Seul le 'cogito' pré-réflexif fonde les droits du 'cogito' réflexif et de la reflexion."[20] In this respect, Sartre's approach is confronted with the *de se* requirement and the indexical reference. His approach of the expulsion of the existence of the ego from consciousness is therefore to be corrected. The correction is to be applied in such a way as to include the critique of Castañeda's "as" construction of self-reference "ONE refers to (things of) ONEself *as oneself.*"

(ii)   First person sentences

The question is thus: What is the role of the indexical expression "I" in first-person sentences? When a speaker refers to himself as an entity with the expression "I", the descriptive content is not relevant. The utterance of the word "I" in turn presupposes a self-referential familiarity of the speaker. In this respect, awareness of oneself *as oneself is* not a property of the utterance of the word "I". This familiarity is an adequate evidence of his self-instantiation. It is not, therefore, the act of saying "I" that ensures the intrinsic property of immediate awareness of myself. This self-reference is not reflexive (relational), but the secondary reference to a property is reflexive. For example, if I ascribe to myself the property of being sad or a belief, then I-self is in a certain state and may also be the subject of reflection and reflection. However, this is not a characterization in causally functional terms.

Ego-consciousness also has a non-thetical (pre-reflexive) component. With sentences such as "I am immediately aware that I am in a certain state," the speaker directly ascribes to himself a state in which no other person is. The ego utterance is therefore not to be disenchanted as an illusion. The I-expression is a referential expression in such a way that the speaker uses it to refer directly to himself. Thus, the ego speaker does not face himself as an object (Augustine, Wittgenstein).

However, I-consciousness cannot be explained by the utterance of the word "I". By no use of any word does consciousness and ego-consciousness become intelligible. The word "I" may conventionally play the role of an indicator through which a speaker expresses the special relation to himself. But the word "I" does not make understandable that the speaker is able to refer to himself *as himself SELF.*

(c) Noêma (Frege sense): intensional content

1. Status of the noêma

If we take into account the direct reference of the semantics of the word "I", there is one more correction to be made to Sartre's approach. Addressed here is the maintenance of content in the *jeu reflet-reflétant* (content intentionality) and the analysis of the notion of phenomenal intentionality.[21] According to Sartre, there is no transcendence in immanence and he rejects the noêma (Husserl). He also did not know Frege's distinction between sense and meaning (reference).[22] The mirror metaphor therefore has an unfortunate epistemological effect. However, an honorary rescue of Sartre's epistemology is to be made to the effect that a *reflex* is something like the noêma or Frege's sense (kind of being given).

The comparison of the reflex with the noêma or Frege sense is close to the *West Coast* interpretation (California School) of Husserl's notion of intentionality and the noêma. It states that the noêma is distinct from an act and an object. It mediates as an ideal meaning the act and the object, that is, Føllesdal compares Husserl's concept of intentionality with Frege's concept of meaning (reference). According to the West Coast reinterpretation, the noêma is an epistemological mediator or a mental representation of the (three-figure representation theory of intentionality). Close to this is a mental *type internalism of* the objects in the external environment. The individual spatio-temporally individuated objects as distinct from and identical with each other as well as the mental contents are thus not of the same type.

2. West coast - east coast reinterpretation

In the Husserl interpretation, the *West Coast* and *East Coast* reinterpretations of intentionality and the noêma are present.[23] The *East Coast* interpretation denies the mediation or mental representation interpretation of the noêma. Their interpretation of the noêma states that the noêma is not a mediator; rather, after the act of epoché and reduction, the objects themselves are given as correlative experience. In this respect, Husserl does not describe the structure of consciousness. This interpretation is also called "presentationalism" (two-figure object theory of intentionality). It comes close to a strict externalism. However, the naturalistic-minded epistemologists would put aside the debate about the epistemological function of noêma as talking about "pseudo-problems", that is, the Quine-Davidson tradition. For Davidson and Quine, there are no epistemic mediators and no mental propositional objects (Quine: museum myth). Davidson calls the assumption of such objects "myth of the subjective."[24] On Husserl's view, intentionality is a subjective reference to external circumstances. In this act, however, intentionality itself is not objective. Only in *reflection* can intentionality be *objectified* according to Husserl. This addresses the fundamental problem in Husserl's phenomenology that all immediate consciousness is a limit concept of reflection. [25]

6.   Conclusion: epistemological mediators

It is always worth remembering with regard to the present situation in Philosophy of the Mental that there is no epistemological standpoint for a naturalized epistemology and a materialist metaphysics to take seriously for

the conceptualization of object knowledge. The "subject point of view", as Farkas (2008) calls it, is therefore systematically negligible. If we introduce the outlined reorientation in epistemology and the philosophy of the mental, then we go to a very fundamental distance to naturalism and materialism. The basic subject-object relation is the consciousness-awareness of ___. This consciousness-consciousness is an immediate/pre-reflective consciousness about which we just cannot take a third person attitude. All versions of the higher-order approaches fail because of this.

It should be emphasized above all that the epistemological problem relation of the classification of intentionality and noêma is that the content of what a thinker (speaker), for example, believes, desires, strives for and hopes for is also directly conscious to him/herself as mental state and content (intensional requirement). In this respect, epistemological mediators are not the objects themselves, but a way of being given. It is somewhat pointedly formulated to balance the kind of being-given with objective cognition. The contents of mental states are the *reflex of* the object of perception, which is directly given to us. However, it is triggered by the environment. This is Sartre's version of a strict externalism. The inclusion of the noêma as a kind of Frege sense in the analysis of the consciousness-awareness of __ as a three-digit relation would thus be epistemologically classified as a *pre-reflexive internalism of* external representations. One could also express this in terms of complexity theory: The environment is more complex than consciousness, and consciousness can only differentiate itself in a correspondence with the concurrence of time. The problem reference here is how immediate (pre-reflexive) consciousness aligns with the representation of the external environment. This initiates a renewal of internalism, since consciousness is immediately and non-objectively familiar with itself without objectifying itself in turn, for example, by reflection as the objective turning back to itself.

[1] M. Frank, 6. Varieties of Subjectivity, pp. in: Frank, Views of Subjectivity, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 2012, U. Kriegel, The Varieties of Consciousness, Oxford G.B.: Oxford University Press 2015.

[2] M. Merleau-Ponty: The Adventures of Dialectics (1955). Frankfurt a. M./Berlin: Suhrkamp 1968.

[3] On the state of research: S. Miguens, G. Preyer eds: Consciousness and Subjectivity. Berlin: De Gruyter 2013, Miguens, C. Bravo Morando, Preyer eds: Pre-reflective Consciousness. Early Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. London: Routledge 2015, G. Seel: Sartres Dialektik. Zur Methode und Begründung seiner Philosophie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Subjekt-, Zeit- und Werttheorie. Bonn: Bourvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann 1971, pp. 120-180, Seel: "Wie ist Bewusstsein von Zeitlichem möglich?". In Violetta Waibel et al. eds: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 2005, Seel: "Husserl's Problems with Time-Consciousness and Why He Did Not Solve Them." In Frank, N. Weidtmann eds: Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 2010, Seel: "Pre-reflective Time-Consciousness. The Shortcomings of Sartre and Husserl and a possible Way out." In Miguens, Bravo Morando, Preyer eds: Pre-reflectivity (FN 2), pp. 120-139, Frank, 3. Time and Self, pp. 191-161, in: Frank. Ansichten der Subjektivität, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2012, Frank, Prereflective Self-Consciousness. Vier Vorlesungen, Stuttgart: Reclam 2015. Frank, Preyer: Pre-reflectivity and Contemporary Philosophy of Consciousness. In Routledge Philosophy of Mind: Sartre. Edited by Eshelman, C. Mui and C. Perrin eds, Routledge Philosophy Minds: Sartre, London, New York: Routledge 2019. Still recommended for introduction is J. Möller. Absurd Being? An examination of the ontology of J. P. Sartre. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1959. On a critique on externalism from the the subject point of view: K. Farkas, The Subject's Point of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008.

   J. P. Sartre: L'être et le néant, Paris: Gallimart 1943, Sartre, Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi (lecture on June 2, 1947), Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie, XLIIe année, no 3, avril-juin 1948, pp. 367-411. Sartre's text leads to the difficulty for the reader that he argues in parts in a concise manner and does not fully elaborate his approach. For a resystematization of Sartre's lecture, see Frank: Sartre's Lecture Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi. Eine Argumentationsskizze, pp. 247-264, in H. Linneweber-Lamerskitten, G. Mohr eds, Interpretation und Argument, Gerhard Seel zum 60. Geburtstag, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002, Extended version in French translation by Guillaume Seydoux and Laurent Husson ("Structure de l'argumentation de la conférence de Sartre Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi"). In Le Portique. Philosophie et sciences humaines, publiée par l'Université de Metz: Sartre. Conscience et Liberté, Numéro 16, 2005, pp. 9-32.

[4] D. Henrich: Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht (1966): In Henrich, Dies Ich, ds viel besagt Fichtes Einsicht nachdenken, Frankfurt a. M. Klostermann 2019, 7-49.

[5] Seel: Sartre's Dialectic (FN 3). On the problem of this determination and the accompanying erroneous connection to phenomenology, which leave the conceptual status of the distinctions unclear p. 83-84.

[6] Sartre: Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi (FN 3), p. 381.

[7] Sartre: L'être et le néant (FN 3), p. 29.

[8] Ibid, p. 708.

[9] Sartre: Les jeux sont faits (1943), film: Cannes 1947, screen-play Sartre and J. Delannoy, direction L. Goulian, H. Jaquillard. Sartre did not present the film as an exemplification of his philosophy, since in the film there is a determination of the story of the two main characters. For a philosophical interpretation from Sartre's philosophy point of view: J. Ekberg, Invisible Ghosts: Les jeux sont faits and disembodied. In Miguens, Preyer, Bravo Morando eds, Pre-Reflectivity (Fn 3), pp. 495-506.

[10] Sartre: "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (FN 3), p. 367 dazu Frank: "Zweite Vorlesung Hilfreiche Differenzierungen durch Jean-Paul Sartre". In Frank: Präreflexives Bewusstsein (FN 3), p. 78.

[11] Sartre: "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (lecture delivered June 2, 1947), Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie (FN 3).

[12] Ibid, p. 380.

[13] Frank refers in regard to featureless consciousness to M. Tye, "Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience." In Noûs, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 2002, pp. 137-151.

[14] Sartre: L'être et le néant (Fn 75). "V. La preuve ontologique," pp. 26-29. Frank: Pre-reflexive Consciousness (Fn 66), on the reconstruction of the ontological proof in contrast to Sartre's account pp. 82-83.

[15] Frank: Pre-reflexive Consciousness (Fn 66), pp. 82-83.

[16] Sartre: "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (FN 127), p. 385.

[17] C. McGinn: Mental Content (FN 33), p. 22, note 31 interprets Sartre as an externalist, since from his point of view he determines consciousness as "for itself" as nothingness and consciousness as "in-itself" through substantial objects. For criticism, see Frank, Prereflexive Consciousness (66), pp. 109-110, McGinn does not consider the problem of content preservation in Sartre.

[18] This is quite consistent with von Kutschera's polar dualism of the theory of mind and the type difference of pure mental and physical predicates, which starts from the premise that there cannot be mental without physical: von Kutschers: Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, Berlin 1982, pp. 337-343, von Kutschera.: Philosophie des Geistes (FN 11), pp. 212-218.

[19] Seel: Sartre's Dialectic (FN 3). Pp. 120-180, eds: "How is consciousness of the temporal possible?". In Violetta Waibel et al (eds): Consciousness and self-consciousness. Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 2005, eds: "Husserl's Problems with Time-Consciousness and Why He Did Not Solve Them." In Frank, N. Weidtmann eds, Husserl and the Philosophy of Mind. Berlin 2010, eds, "Pre-reflective Time-Consciousness. The Shortcomings of Sartre and Husserl and a possible Way out." In Bravo Morando, Preyer eds, Pre-reflectivity (FN 3). A more detailed analysis falls into kinesthetics (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, White Hatch) and self-conditioning, which has to include the time dimension. Merleau-Ponty's Sartre critique that Sartre does not adequately account for perception, however, cannot be wholeheartedly agreed with.

On the concept of time (-consciousness): W. K. Essler: Kant und kein Ende. In Essler: Unser die Welt. Linguistic-philosophical foundations of epistemology. Selected articles. Ed. by Gerhard Preyer, Frankfurt a. M. 2001. On the concept of time and the biological clock pp. 50-52, Essler: Theorie und Erfahrung. Eine Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie, Freiburg i. B. 2000, pp. 107-121.

In the analysis of the time consciousness it is recommended to separate the phenomenal time consciousness from the time theories of physics, otherwise from the beginning not bridgeable problems of understanding occur. The general relativity theory and the Gödel universe (1929) assume, for example, that the experience time as a uniform passing of time is not an (a priori) necessary property of every universe. If we assume that an entity moves with vacuum light speed, then the time would stand still.

[20] Sartre: "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (FN 3), p. 368. For a comparison of Sartre's approach in Sartre: The Transcendence of the Ego (1936/37) and Sartre, L'être et l'néant, Paris: Gallimard 1943, Teply: "Sartre's Non-egological Theory of Consciousness (FN 3), pp. 298-316, Eshleman, "A Sketch of Sartre's Error Theory of Introspection. In Miguens, Preyer, Bravo Morando eds: Pre-Reflective Consciouness (FN 3). On Introspection pp. 176-207, on a reinterpretation P. S. Morris, "Sartre on the Transcendence of the Ego." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 1985, on a reinterpretation pp. 179-198.

[21] T. Horgan, and J. Tienson, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and tbe Phenomenology of Intentionalit, in: D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Oxford UK 2002, pp. 520-31.

[22] This is not an objection, however, since Frege was not known in France at the time. It may be that he was known by a few experts. According to Frege, the sense (kind of being given) determines the meaning (reference), that is, not the sense designates something, but a linguistic expression refers by the force of the sense, that is, there is an object on the other side which the expression designates (Frege-meaning (reference).

[23] *West Coast* interpreters include, for example, D. Føllesdal, D. (1974), Husserl's Theory of Perception, Ajatus 36 1974, pp. 95-103, H. L. Dreyfus, H.L. (1982), Husserl's Perceptual Noema', in: H. L. Dreyfus and H. Hall (eds), Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA 1982, pp. 97-123, D. W. Smith and McIntyre, R. (1982), Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht 1982 and R. McIntyre, Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind, Topoi 5 1986, pp. 101-113. The *East Coast* interpretation includes, for example, R. Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution. The Hague 1970, Sokolowski, Husserl and Frege, The Journal of Philosophy 84 1987, pp. 521-528, J. J. Drummond, An abstract consideration: de-ontologizing the noema, in: Drummond. and L. Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 89-109, and J. G. Hart, A Precis of a Husserlian Phenomenological Theology, in: S. C. Laycock and J. G. Hart (eds.), Essays in Phenomenological Theology, Albany, pp. 89-168. For a discussion of both Noêma interpretations and further reading Dan Zahavi, Husserl's Legacy Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Oxford GB 2017.

[24] Davidson, Seeing Through Language (1997), in: Davidson, Truth, Language, and History, Oxford UK 2005, on the critique of epistemological mediators p. 135, Davidson, The Myth of the Subjective (1988). in: Subjective, Intersubjective (Fn 5), pp. 39-52.

[25] cf. Fn. 95.

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