In the present problem situation (Popper) of the philosophy of the mental, research programs can be recognized which claim to systematize the relation between non-conceptual consciousness, ego consciousness and the intentional contents of mental representations, for example a frame of reference for the varieties of subjectivity.1 However, the return to Sartre’s philosophy of the subject as a historical position in the great upheavals of 20th century social history has a systematic relevance in the hybrid present problem situation of the philosophy of the mental. It provides “helpful differentiations” and can take a possible role of a mediator as a theoretical contribution
to the debate between internalism (representationalism) and externalism (anti-
representationalism) in the contemporary philosophy of mental (so-called mind). However, in order to connect to the current situation in epistemology, philosophy of the mental, and ontology, Sartre’s “early philosophy” requires a reinterpretation.
If we bridge from Sartre’s early philosophy to the debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind, he gets a new actuality and is updated vis-à-vis his meanwhile for us remote historical philosophical position. This also concerns the criticism of the concept of mental representation as a basic concept of the philosophy of the mental. How far this really carries philosophically remains to be further explored. Sartre’s Marxist socio-political philosophy and his “Ultrabolshevism” (Merleau Ponty) are not of interest here. > GBitte den ganzen Beitrag lesen.